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NOTES
DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS-ARKANSAS FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT. Act of April 14, 1987, No. 967, 1987 Ark. Acts
3282 (Adv. Leg. Ser.) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201 to
-213 (Supp. 1987)).
In 1987 Arkansas became one of the first states to adopt the Uni-
form Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).1 Act 967 of 1987, known as
the Arkansas Fraudulent Transfer Act (AFTA), 2 replaces all of Ar-
kansas' earlier statutes on fraudulent conveyances.3 The AFTA
reaches both those transfers in which the debtor had actual intent to
keep his property from falling into the hands of his creditors and
those cases in which the presence of certain acts, conditions, or cir-
cumstances raise the presumption that a debtor's transfer of his prop-
erty was fraudulent. Because creditors are entitled to the assets of a
debtor in default, attempts by the debtor to transfer his property in
derogation of the creditors' rights merit close scrutiny. The law of
fraudulent conveyances provides equitable remedies, such as having
the transfer set aside, for the creditor who has been prejudiced by
such transfers.
Due to the multiplicity and variety of American laws on the
voidability of fraudulent conveyances, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) in 1918.' Twenty-six jurisdic-
tions subsequently adopted the Uniform Act.' In 1984 the Commis-
1. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 643 (1985). Other states enacting
the UFTA are California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. For
citations to the UFTA in these jurisdictions, see infra note 95.
2. Act of April 14, 1987, No. 967, 1987 Ark. Acts 3282 (Adv. Leg. Ser.) (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201 to -213 (Supp. 1987)).
3. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201 to -208 (repealed 1987).
4. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427, 427 (1985).
5. Eighteen of those states and territories retain the UFCA: Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 44-1001 to -1013 (1967 & Supp. 1986)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1301-
1312 (1975)); Maryland (MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 15-201 to -214 (1983 & Supp.
1986)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 109A, §§ 1-13 (West 1958)); Michigan
(MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 566.11-.23 (West 1967)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-
2-301 to -325 (1987)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 36-601 to -613 (1984)); New Hampshire
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sioners approved a revision of the UFCA, in order to incorporate the
law's evolution since 1918,6 especially in light of certain provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Commercial Code.' Arkansas
adopted this new uniform act, the UFTA, virtually verbatim.
The law governing fraudulent conveyances of property has a long
history, going back to the days of the Romans. The Code of Emperor
Justinian provided relief to sixth century Roman creditors whose
debtors attempted to avoid their obligations.' As for Anglo-Ameri-
can treatment of the subject, the law governing fraudulent convey-
ances dates from the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. The Statute of 13
Elizabeth invalidated any transaction in which the debtor had actual
intent "to delay, hinder or defraud creditors." 9 Actual subjective in-
tent to defraud was not so easily proven, however. As an aid to deter-
mining the existence of such intent, the English courts soon began to
recognize certain objective evidence of fraudulent intent, also known
as "badges of fraud."t "
Whether they appear singly or in concert, the "badges of fraud"
address a wide assortment of situations, including: transfers to
spouses or other near relatives;1 transfers made by a debtor who is, or
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 545:1-:12 (1974)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 25:2-7 to :2-19
(West 1940 & Supp. 1987)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-10-1 to -13 (1986)); New
York (N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §9 270-281 (McKinney 1945 & Supp. 1988)); Ohio (OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1336.01-.12 (Anderson 1979)); Pennsylvania (39 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 351-363 (Purdon 1954)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-3-301 to -314 (1982)); Utah
(UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 §§ 25-1-1 to -16 (1984 & Supp. 1987)); Virgin Islands (V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 28, §§ 201-12 (1976)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 242.01-.13 (West 1987));
Wyoming (WYo. STAT. 1977 §§ 34-14-101 to -113 (1977 & Supp. 1987)).
Eight states have repealed the UFCA, replacing it with the UFTA. See infra note 95.
6. For a good overview of the UFTA see Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 195 (1986). Professor Kennedy served as the reporter to the Act's drafting
committee.
7. UFTA prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 639-40.
8. See 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 60 (rev. ed.
1940); Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REV. 109 (1931).
9. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570).
10. In Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601), Lord Coke enumerated
several factors indicating the debtor's fraudulent intent to convey all of his property to Twyne.
The "badges" included the transfer of all the debtor's property, both real and personal, the
debtor's continued possession of the property, the secrecy of the transfer, the pendency of
litigation, the transfer made in trust for the benefit of the debtor, and the recitation in the deed
that the transfer was made honestly. Id. at 812-14. See also Harris v. Shaw, 224 Ark. 150,
154, 272 S.W.2d 53, 55 (1954) (discussing "badges or indicia of fraud").
11. See In re Baugh, 60 Bankr. 102, 106 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986); Ralston Purina Co. v.
Davis, 256 Ark. 972, 975, 511 S.W.2d 482, 484 (1974); Southern Lumber Co. v. Riley, 224
Ark. 298, 303, 273 S.W.2d 848, 852 (1954); Lessman v. Dawson, 14 Ark. App. 285, 289, 687
S.W.2d 860, 863 (1985).
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is rendered thereby, insolvent; 2 transfers made for less than fair con-
sideration;13 transfers after which the transferor retains possession or
beneficial use of the property;1 4 transfers of all or most of the debtor's
property, leaving virtually nothing for creditors;' 5 transfers made
while litigation is pending;' 6 and secret or concealed transfers. 7
In America, the states either adopted the Statute of 13 Elizabeth
as part of their common law, or they enacted similar legislation. ' As
a natural part of the growth of fraudulent conveyance law, however,
jurisdictions began to differ in their interpretations of intent and in the
weight given to governing factors.1 9 Despite the Statute of 13 Eliza-
beth's focus on actual intent of the transferor, courts eventually devel-
oped conclusive presumptions of fraud based on the presence or
combination of certain factors.2°
The increasing diversity of laws and presumptions influenced the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
draft a uniform act that would resolve such differences. 21 The draft-
ers of the UFCA focused on defining insolvency, establishing consis-
tent procedural steps, and clarifying the application of fraudulent
conveyances law to instances of constructive fraud, where there was
12. See Rees v. Craighead Inv. Co., 251 Ark. 336, 341, 472 S.W.2d 92, 96 (1971) (defining
insolvency); Brady v. Irby, 101 Ark. 573, 578, 142 S.W. 1124, 1125 (1912).
13. See Ouachita Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Evans-St. Clair, 12 Ark. App. 171, 180, 672
S.W.2d 660, 665 (1984) (finding adequate consideration but discussing "inadequacy of price so
gross that it shocks the conscience"); Ralston Purina Co. v. Davis, 256 Ark. 972, 975, 511
S.W.2d 482, 484 (1974).
14. See Rush v. Smith, 239 Ark. 706, 709, 394 S.W.2d 613, 616 (1965); Wasson v. Lightle,
188 Ark. 440, 445, 66 S.W.2d 652, 653 (1933).
15. See Reeves v. Sherwood, 45 Ark. 520, 523 (1885).
16. See Bumpass v. McGehee, 247 F. 306, 308 (8th Cir. 1917); In re Baugh, 60 Bankr.
102, 105 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986).
17. See Weatherly v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 245 Ark. 317, 320-21, 432 S.W.2d 18, 20-21
(1968); McConnell v. Hopkins, 86 Ark. 225, 230, 110 S.W. 1039, 1041 (1908).
18. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 8, § 58. Arkansas' reception statute, ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-
2-119 (1987), incorporated the Statute of Elizabeth into the state's common law without the
necessity of further legislation.
19. For example, the validity of a gift made by a donor who thereafter became insolvent
was upheld in the majority of jurisdictions, while Alabama and Kentucky considered such a
gift to be voidable. UFCA prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 428.
20. See, eg., Simon v. Reynolds-Davis Grocery Co., 108 Ark. 164, 169, 156 S.W. 1015,
1016 (1913) (citing Wilks v. Vaughan, 73 Ark. 174, 179, 83 S.W. 913, 915 (1904)
("[C]onveyances made to members of the household and near relatives of any embarrassed
debtor are looked upon with suspicion and scrutinized with care and when they are voluntary,
they are prima facie fraudulent, and when the embarrassment of the debtor proceeds to finan-
cial wreck, they are presumed conclusively to be fraudulent as to existing creditors.")).
21. UFCA prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 428.
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no actual or demonstrable fraudulent intent behind the transfer.22
While the UFCA received considerable attention from the com-
mentators, 23 as well as enactment in a significant number of jurisdic-
tions,24 the National Conference of Commissioners nevertheless
concluded that changes in bankruptcy, corporate, and commercial
law since 1918 called for the creation of a new uniform act designed to
take those changes into account. 2' The drafters particularly desired
to harmonize the new uniform act with those provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the Uniform Commercial Code that conflicted with
the UFCA.26
Prior to the passage of the AFTA, Arkansas' fraudulent convey-
ance law, while statutory, was "substantially the same as the Statute
of Elizabeth. ' 27 The basic provision mirrored the English statute by
declaring that any conveyance or legal action undertaken "with the
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors" was void.28 Avoidance of
the transfer required proof of fraudulent intent on the part of both the
transferor and his transferee.29 Only a creditor of the transferor could
attack such a conveyance. 3° Arkansas creditors did not need to ob-
22. See Alces & Dorr, A Critical Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 527, 532-33.
23. See, e.g., Bridgman, Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L.
REV. 453 (1923); Glenn, Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act; Rights of Creditor Without
Judgment, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 202 (1930); McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1933); Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in Califor-
nia and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1938); Rose &
Hunsinger, Transfers in Fraud of Creditors, Ohio Law and the Uniform Act, 9 OHIO ST. L.J.
571 (1948); Note, Rights of Creditors Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 35 DICK.
L. REV. 171 (1931); Recent Decisions, Fraudulent Conveyances-Executory Consideration as
Fair Consideration Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 39 MICH. L. REV. 654
(1941); Comment, Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in Pennsylvania, 5 U. Prrr. L. REV.
161 (1939).
24. See sources cited supra note 5.
25. UFTA prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 639-40.
26. See id. at 641-42. Conflicting provisions are those that dealt with definitions of key
terms, with possible defenses for good faith transferees, insiders, or U.C.C. Article 9 secured
parties, and with establishment of the time that a cause of action arises. For a more detailed
discussion of the new uniform act's treatment of those provisions, see infra notes 43-59, 73-76,
85-87 and accompanying text.
27. Payne v. Bruton, 10 Ark. 53, 59 (1849). For a general discussion of former Arkansas
law, see Comment, Fraudulent Conveyances in Arkansas, 19 ARK. L. REV. 149 (1965).
28. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204(a) (1987) (repealed 1987).
29. Bank of Sun Prairie v. Hovig, 218 F. Supp. 769, 775 (W.D. Ark. 1963); In re Baugh,
60 Bankr. 102, 105 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986); Wright v. Aaron, 214 Ark. 254, 257, 215 S.W.2d
725, 726 (1948).
30. Segraves v. Brooks, 123 Ark. 261, 265, 185 S.W. 260, 261 (1916) (citing Millington v.
Hill, Fontaine & Co., 47 Ark. 301, 309, 1 S.W. 547, 549 (1886)); King v. Clay, 34 Ark. 291,
299-300 (1879).
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tain a judgment of insolvency against the debtor before going into a
court of equity to ask that the conveyance be set aside as fraudulent, 3'
although at common law such a requisite existed.32
As to both existing creditors and subsequent purchasers, prior
Arkansas law voided the gift or conveyance of personalty made "in
trust to the use" of the transferor.33 Such a transfer was conclusively
fraudulent, since all it accomplished was the transfer of title from the
debtor to a new owner, while the debtor was still able to use and enjoy
the transferred property.34
Unlike the transferee who participated in the fraud,35 a subse-
quent bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud es-
caped the creditors' equitable claims on the property.36 Since the
purchaser was not involved in the fraudulent transaction, the courts
protected his interest by returning to him the consideration he paid. 7
"Good consideration," or in the case of gifts, actual surrender of
possession, had to accompany every conveyance.38 The courts found
insufficient consideration if "gross disparity" existed between the ac-
tual value of the property and the amount received for it by the
debtor.39
Even if properly recorded (for those transfers which required a
filing), a conveyance made with intent to defraud creditors was voida-
ble by those creditors.' Conversely, failure to record a transaction
did not necessarily indicate fraud.4 But as between the parties to the
transfer themselves, and against anyone except the creditors, the
transfer was valid.42
31. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-208 (1987) (repealed 1987).
32. See 1 G. GLENN, supra note 8, § 65.
33. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-203 (1987) (repealed 1987).
34. See Lukins v. Aird, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 78, 79 (1867); McConnell v. Hopkins, 86 Ark.
225, 230-31, 110 S.W. 1039, 1041 (1908).
35. See Smith v. Arkadelphia Milling Co., 143 Ark. 214, 220, 220 S.W. 49, 52 (1920);
Millington v. Hill, Fontaine & Co., 47 Ark. 301, 311, 1 S.W. 547, 550 (1886).
36. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201, -204(b) (1987) (repealed 1987). See Rowland v. Ward,
178 Ark. 851, 856, 12 S.W.2d 785, 787 (1929); Swafford v. Ketchum, 177 Ark. 1152, 1156, 9
S.W.2d 806, 807 (1928).
37. See Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Harris, 113 Ark. 100, 112, 167 S.W. 706, 709
(1914).
38. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-205 (1987) (repealed 1987).
39. Harmon v. McSpadden, 174 Ark. 184, 190, 295 S.W. 353, 355 (1927).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-202 (1987) (repealed 1987).
41. See Singfield v. Niemeyer, 194 Ark. 1155, 108 S.W.2d 465, 467 (1937) (opinion omit-
ted in Arkansas Reports).
42. See Melvin v. Melvin, 270 Ark. 522, 525, 606 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ark. App. 1980) (citing
Maupin v. Gains, 125 Ark. 181, 185, 188 S.W. 552, 554 (1916)) alternate holding overruled,
McCune v. Brown, 8 Ark. App. 51, 648 S.W.2d 811 (1983).
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The repealed statutes did not define any terms, nor did they dis-
tinguish between actual and constructive intent to defraud creditors.
Where the previous statutes did not give definitive guidelines, case law
supplied instruction. The AFTA, however, addresses many areas in
which prior statutory law was silent.
The AFTA begins with definitions of key terms.4 3 Many of the
definitions derive from other pieces of legislation, although some are
original to the Uniform Act.4 Of particular interest are the defini-
tions of "insolvent," "asset," and "value." Because the Act declares
that certain transfers by "insolvent" debtors are fraudulent as to cred-
itors,4" the classification of a debtor as insolvent is of crucial
importance.
Under the AFTA, a debtor is "insolvent" if the sum of his debts
is greater than all of his fairly valued remaining assets.46 Insolvent
partnerships are those whose debts are greater than the sum of (1) the
partnership's assets and (2) the amount that each general partner's
outside assets exceed his outside debts.47  A presumption of insol-
vency arises when a debtor is generally not paying his debts as they
come due.48 In determining whether the debtor is paying his debts on
time, courts will consider the proportion of unpaid debts to the total
number of obligations owed by the debtor, the length of time the pay-
ment has been overdue, and the existence of any circumstances which
would give the debtor a good faith reason to dispute or otherwise
avoid payment of his debts.49
The debtor's "assets," for purposes of establishing insolvency, do
not include any property that has been the subject of a fraudulent
transfer." Furthermore, when any property that is used to secure an
obligation is not counted among the debtor's assets for purposes of
determining insolvency, the obligation is not counted among his
43. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201 to -203 (Supp. 1987).
44. The Bankruptcy Code is the source of definitions for "affiliate," "claim," "debt," "in-
sider," "insolvent," "lien," "relative," "transfer," and "value." 11 U.S.C. §§ 101,
548(d)(2)(A) (1982). The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act provided definitions for "as-
sets" and "creditor." UFCA § 1, 7A U.L.A. at 430. The terms "person" and "property"
come from the Uniform Commercial Code, U.C.C. § 1-201(30) (1978), and the Uniform Pro-
bate Code. U.P.C. § 1-201(33) (1982). The definitions of "debtor" and "valid lien" are new.
UFTA § 1 comments 1-13, § 2 comment 1, and § 3 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. at 645-48, 650-51.
45. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-205 (Supp. 1987).
46. Id. § 4-59-202(a).
47. Id. § 4-59-202(c).
48. Id. § 4-59-202(b).
49. UFTA § 2 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. at 648-49.
50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-202(d) (Supp. 1987).
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debts.5  Finally, the definition of "assets" excludes property that is
subject to a lien or exempt under nonbankruptcy law as well as inter-
ests in a tenancy by the entirety where the creditor does not have a
claim against the tenants as joint debtors.52
"Value" refers not just to consideration given for an obligation,
but also to the sufficiency of that consideration.53 The AFTA does
not expressly define "value," but the term encompasses the transfer of
property as well as the satisfaction or security of a debt.54 It does not
include executory promises to pay.55 "Value" is sufficient when it is
"reasonably equivalent" to the value of the interest in the property
being transferred.5 6  In response to a widely-debated ruling by the
Fifth Circuit in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co.,57 the
UFTA and AFTA expressly confirm the adequacy of consideration
received when the debtor sells his property in a "regularly conducted,
noncollusive foreclosure sale." '58
The UFTA includes in its definition of "value" the acquisition of
a defaulting debtor's deed of trust or security agreement pursuant to
such a foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale.59 Arkansas,
however, excludes the deed of trust and security agreement from the
equivalent provision in the AFTA.6° This omission is the only sub-
stantive change Arkansas made in the Uniform Act.6'
The heart of the AFTA is contained in the sections describing
transfers fraudulent to creditors. The AFTA distinguishes between
two classes of potential plaintiffs-creditors whose claims predate the
challenged transfer ("present creditors") and creditors whose claims
arise after the transfer in question ("future creditors").62 Section 4-
59-204 applies to both classes, while the provisions of section 4-59-205
51. Id. § 4-59-202(e).
52. Id. § 4-59-201(2); see also UFTA § 1 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. at 645-46.
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-203 (Supp. 1987).
54. Id. § 4-59-203(a).
55. Id.
56. UFTA § 3 comment 3, 7A U.L.A. at 651.
57. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that receipt of 57.7% of the fair market value at
a foreclosure sale amounted to a fraudulent transfer). The court also noted that it was unable
to find a case in which a transfer for less than 70% of the market value had been approved. Id.
at 203.
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-203(b) (Supp. 1987); see also UFTA § 3 comment 5, 7A
U.L.A. at 652.
59. UFTA § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. at 650.
60. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-203(b) (Supp. 1987).
61. Compare UFTA § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. at 650, with ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-203(b)
(Supp. 1987).
62. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-204, -205 (Supp. 1987).
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apply only to present creditors.63 Either class of creditor may seek
relief whenever actual fraudulent intent is present, or whenever the
debtor receives less than "reasonable equivalent value" for the prop-
erty, and his remaining assets are too small--or imminent debts too
large-for him to conduct his business or honor his obligations.
64
In describing the category of transfers made "with actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor," the AFTA echoes the lan-
guage of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. 65 Because actual intent is a sub-
jective matter, not susceptible of easy proof, the AFTA lists eleven
nonexclusive factors which, like the "badges of fraud," a court may
consider in determining whether actual intent to harm creditors' in-
terests existed.66 The mere presence of one or more of these factors
does not create a presumption of fraudulent intent, although it may be
relevant to the proof of intent.6 v Courts should consider all relevant
circumstances, not just the section 4-59-204(b) catalog, in evaluating
the validity of a questionable transfer.68 Furthermore, the catalog
contains considerations that negate fraudulent intent as well as con-
siderations that suggest it.69
63. Id.
64. Id. § 4-59-204(a).
65. Id. § 4-59-204(a)(1).
66. ARK. CODE ANN. P§ 4-59-204(b) rvides:
In determining actual intent .... consideration may be given, among other factors,
to whether:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the
transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been
sued or threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(6) the debtor absconded;
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent
to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was in-
curred; and
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who trans-
ferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
Id. § 4-59-204(b) (Supp. 1987).
67. UFTA § 4 comment 5, 7A U.L.A. at 654.
68. Id. § 4 comment 6, at 654-56 (e.g., transfer of assets into corporations created solely
for that purpose, joint possession of property by debtor and transferee, sale of all the assets of
an insolvent debtor in a single transaction).
69. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204(b)(3) (Supp. 1987) ("the transfer or obligation was
504
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Section 4-59-205 conclusively establishes constructive fraud to-
ward present creditors whenever an insolvent debtor transfers the
property to anyone for less than "reasonably equivalent value," or
when he transfers property in satisfaction of a preexisting obligation
to an insider who has reason to believe in the insolvency of the
debtor.70 This category of fraud exists without regard to the intent of
the debtor and his transferee.7
Another significant provision of the AFTA concerns the accrual
of a cause of action. In most cases, a cause of action arises under the
AFTA as of the date of the completion of the challenged transfer.72
The AFTA applies only to those transactions that fit one of the cate-
gories of section 4-59-206. For interests that must be perfected in or-
der to preserve the priority rights of the debtor's transferee over the
claims of other parties, the transfer is considered complete as of the
moment of perfection-whether by attachment of a security interest,
transfer of possession, or filing for record.73 Where such an interest is
unperfected, the transfer is deemed complete as of the time immedi-
ately preceding any action undertaken to avoid it.74 A debtor must
have rights in the transferred property-not mere expectation inter-
ests-in order to trigger the Act.75 Notice-filing or other recordation
of an interest to be acquired at a future date is not a form of transfer
that the AFTA addresses. 6
A creditor must commence an action to avoid a transfer within
four years after the transfer is completed.77 There are two exceptions
disclosed") & § 4-59-204(b)(8) ("the value of the consideration received . . . was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred").
70. Id. § 4-59-205. "Insiders" include relatives, partners, corporate directors and officers,
affiliates, and managing agents of the debtor. Id. § 4-59-201(7).
71. In contrast to § 4-59-204, § 4-59-205 omits any mention of intent or any catalog of
factors indicating intent. Id. §§ 4-59-204, -205.
72. Id. § 4-59-206. This provision is derived from the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(d)(1) (1982). UFTA § 6 comment 1, 7A U.L.A. at 659.
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-206(1)(i), (ii) (Supp. 1987). See also U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -304, -
305 (1978) (perfection of security interest in personal property).
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-206(2) (Supp. 1987).
75. Id. § 4-59-206(4).
76. UFTA § 6 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. at 659-60.
77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-209 (Supp. 1987). This section is designed to standardize
the statutes of limitation as they apply to fraudulent transfers, regardless of who brings the
action or who is named in the suit. See also UFTA § 9 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. at 666. Prior to
passage of the AFTA, other statutory barriers governed fraudulent conveyance actions, with
periods ranging from three years (replevin, ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-810(a)(6) (1987)) to five
years (notes and instruments in writing, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-111 (1987)) to ten years
(actions based on judgments or decrees, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-114 (1987)). See also Hes-
son, The Statute of Limitations in Actions to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances and in Actions
Against Directors by Creditors of Corporations, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 222 (1946). "In Arkansas
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to the four-year statutory bar. If an insolvent debtor transferred the
property to an insider who had notice of his transferor's insolvency,
then existing creditors have only one year after the effective date of
that transfer in which to bring suit. 7  And once the four-year period
has passed, if actual fraudulent intent is thereafter discovered or dis-
coverable, the claimant still has one year in which to bring suit. 79
Various forms of relief are available to the creditor who estab-
lishes a fraudulent transfer of property formerly held by his debtor.
Remedies under the AFTA include avoidance of the transfer or obli-
gation, injunctions against further disposition of the property, ap-
pointment of a receiver to manage the asset, attachment of the
transferred asset,80 or any other relief indicated by the circum-
stances.81 Just as under the former law in Arkansas, 2 a creditor need
not obtain a judgment against a debtor before proceeding under the
AFTA.s3 When the desired remedy is avoidance of the transfer, a
creditor's recovery is limited to a judgment for the value of the trans-
ferred asset or the amount of his claim, whichever is smaller.8 4
The AFTA recognizes three defenses that a transferee may raise
against a creditor's claim. First, if the transferee took in good faith
and for value, he is protected to the extent of the value given.8 5 Sec-
ond, the transferee is protected if the transfer resulted from the termi-
nation of a lease due to the debtor's default or from the enforcement
of a U.C.C. Article 9 security interest8 6 Third, an insider-transferee
may be protected by meeting certain criteria. He is protected (1) to
the extent of new value given to the debtor after the transfer was
made, unless the new value was secured by a valid lien; (2) if the
transfer was made in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and
the creditor may sue within ten years after obtaining judgment, the statutory time for enforce-
ment of a judgment against the debtor's property. If he sues within that time he will not be
barred unless the grantee has had adverse possession for the statutory period of seven years."
Id. at 237 (citing James v. Mallory, 76 Ark. 509, 89 S.W. 472 (1905); A. Baldwin & Co. v.
Williams, 74 Ark. 316, 86 S.W. 423 (1905)).
78. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-209(c) (Supp. 1987). See also id. § 4-59-205(b).
79. Id. § 4-59-209(a).
80. Arkansas included an optional provision for attachment against the asset transferred
or other property of the debtor, subject to the procedural safeguards contained in ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-110-201 to -211 (1987). Id. § 4-59-207(a)(2) (Supp. 1987). It is also possible to
levy execution on a transferred asset or its proceeds, but this option requires a court order
before it may be exercised. Id. § 4-59-207(b).
81. Id. § 4-59-207(a) (Supp. 1987).
82. Id. § 4-59-208 (1987) (repealed 1987). See also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
83. See UFTA § 7 comment 4, 7A U.L.A. at 661.
84. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-208(b) (Supp. 1987).
85. Id. § 4-59-208(a), (d).
86. Id. § 4-59-208(e).
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the insider; or (3) if the transfer was made pursuant to a good faith
effort to help an insolvent debtor save himself from bankruptcy or the
like.17
The AFTA is certain to affect the practice of fraudulent convey-
ance law in Arkansas. Structurally, its provisions fit into three broad
groups: the definitions, the characterizations of voidable transfers,
and the remedies and defenses of the parties. The definitions serve
more to delineate the interrelationships or standing of the parties than
to clarify fraudulent transfer terminology. A practitioner still needs
to be cognizant of terms like antecedent debt, attachment, avoidance,
encumbrance, fixture, foreclosure, and voidability before he can apply
the provisions of the Act to a pending matter. Nonetheless, terms are
now expressly defined that previously were subject to possible variant
interpretations.
The definition of insolvency merits special note. One Arkansas
case defined insolvency as "a lack of means to pay one's debts,"88
distinguishing between actual insolvency and mere indebtedness of
the debtor. The AFTA not only broadly defines insolvency (the sum
of all the fairly valued assets of the debtor equaling less than the sum
of all his debts), it also provides an "equitable" test of insolvency-
presuming insolvency whenever a debtor does not pay his debts as
they come due.89
The AFTA expands the scope of actual fraud by describing
"badges of fraud" which case law had not previously seen as indica-
tors of a debtor's subjective intent to defraud creditors. These factors
include a transfer of virtually all of the debtor's assets, the voluntary
absence of the debtor from the jurisdiction, transfers taking place
shortly before or after the debtor incurs a substantial debt, and trans-
fers of the essential assets of a business to a lienor who then transfers
those assets to an insider of the debtor.9"
A new form of voidable transfer is set forth in the AFTA, one
that fraudulent conveyance law has heretofore categorized as a legiti-
mate preferential transfer. An insolvent debtor exercises a "prefer-
87. Id. § 4-59-208(f). The first and second defenses come from the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 547(c)(2), (4) (1982). The third defense developed from a policy determination to
encourage insiders who have previously extended credit to the debtor. The drafters of the
UFTA felt that such insider-creditors should not be penalized for further extension of credit
based on a good-faith attempt to help the debtor stave off bankruptcy. UFTA § 8 comment 6,
7A U.L.A. at 664-65.
88. Bank of Sun Prairie v. Hovig, 218 F. Supp. 769, 777 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
89. See Alces & Dorr, supra note 22, at 542.
90. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204(b)(5), (6), (10), (11) (Supp. 1987). See also supra note
66 and accompanying text.
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ence" when he conveys property to one or more of his creditors in
satisfaction of a debt, even though the effect of the transfer is to re-
duce the amount of property available for the claims of other credi-
tors.9' The invalidity of such a transfer is a familiar concept in the
Bankruptcy Code,92 but has not been included in state fraudulent con-
veyance law until now. Under the AFTA, a preferential transfer
made to a knowledgeable insider while the debtor is insolvent is con-
clusively void as to existing creditors.93 Prior case law held that the
preference of one creditor over another did not in itself make the
transfer to the preferred creditor void or voidable as a fraudulent con-
veyance.94 If the preferred transferee is an insider, such conveyances
will be subject to attack by other creditors.
Another effect of the AFTA is to bring Arkansas law into greater
conformity with the law in other jurisdictions.95 The realities of mod-
em commerce mean that interstate transactions are common and that
a debtor may be tempted to convey his property across state lines in
order to confound his creditors. Creditors benefit when state laws are
more uniform, as it is much easier to obtain relief in multi-state
transactions.
The AFTA brings many changes and clarifications to the law of
fraudulent conveyances. It not only gives Arkansas the advantages of
a uniform law, but it in many ways simplifies and refines an area of
the law which has been evolving since the seventeenth century. Un-
like the UFCA, the UFTA is more than a recodification of fraudulent
91. See Gage v. Chastain, 183 Ark. 641, 644-45, 37 S.W.2d 705, 706 (1931).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
93. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-205(b) (Supp. 1987); see also supra note 70.
94. Nicklaus v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 258 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ark. 1965), afid, 369
F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1966).
95. Arkansas joins the following fifteen states in enacting the UFTA: California (CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 3439.1-3439.12 (West Supp. 1988)) (UFCA repealed); Florida (FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 726.101-.112 (West Supp. 1987)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 651C-1 to -10
(1985); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §§ 55-910 to -921 (Cum. Supp. 1987)) (UFCA repealed); Maine
(ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3571-3582 (Supp. 1987)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 513.41-.51 (West Supp. 1988)) (UFCA repealed); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
112.010-.125 (Michie Supp. 1987)) (UFCA repealed); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 13-02.1-01 to -10 (Supp. 1987)) (UFCA repealed); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§§ 112-123 (West 1987)) (UFCA repealed); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 95.200-.310 (1987));
Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-16-1 to -12 (Supp. 1987)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 54-8A-1 to -12 (Supp. 1987)) (UFCA repealed); Texas (TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-.013) (Vernon 1987)); Washington (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 19.40.011-.903) (effective date July 1, 1988) (UFCA repealed); and West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE §§ 40-1A-1 to -12 (Supp. 1987)).
The AFTA also retains many points of correspondence with the UFCA. See supra note 5,
for a list of the states retaining the previous Uniform Act.
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conveyance law. The UFTA was designed to work with, not against,
the Bankruptcy Code, and the adoption of the Uniform Act means
that debtors and creditors can expect more consistent treatment of
their transactions, whether in state court or in bankruptcy court. 9 6
The UFTA and AFTA take into account the inevitable overlap of
fraudulent transfer statutes with federal bankruptcy laws, striving to
consistently apply those elements of debtor-creditor law that also exist
in other statutes. The AFTA is not so revolutionary as to give Arkan-
sas courts cause for alarm, but the alert attorney should acquaint him-
self with those aspects of the Act that modify the practice of
fraudulent transfer law in Arkansas.
Coleen Miller Barger
96. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 203, 205, 208-09.
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